Eternity and time in science: what role do theories of relativity play in the formation of a coherent model of eternity by Lawson, F. & Lawson, F.
Canterbury Christ Church University’s repository of research outputs
http://create.canterbury.ac.uk
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial 
research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be 
reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing 
from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold 
commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. Lawson, F. (2013) 
Eternity and time in science: what role do theories of relativity play in the formation 
of a coherent model of eternity. Other thesis, Heythrop College, University of 
London. 
Contact: create.library@canterbury.ac.uk
Finley Lawson Master of Research in Philosophy: Thesis 2013 
 1 
 
 Eternity and time in Science: What Role do the Theories of Relativity Play in the Formation of a Coherent Model of eternity? 
 
 Finley Lawson   Heythrop College, University of London 2013  
Finley Lawson Master of Research in Philosophy: Thesis 2013 
 2 
Contents 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 3 
§1 Overview .............................................................................................................................. 4 
§2 Background information for the Thesis .......................................................................... 4 
§2.1 Models of Time ............................................................................................................ 5 
§2.2 Models of Eternity ....................................................................................................... 7 
§3 Scientific Theories about Time and the Nature of Reality .......................................... 8 
§3.1 Newtonian Time and Space ....................................................................................... 9 
§3.2 Galilean Relativity: Moving Towards Spacetime .................................................. 12 
§3.2.1 Arithmetic, Geometry and Coordinates ........................................................ 14 
§3.3 Special Relativity Spacetime ................................................................................... 15 
§3.3.1 Introducing Time into Spacetime ................................................................... 17 
§3.3.2 Finding the Geometrical Structure of Minkowski Spacetime ..................... 18 
§4 Scientific Theories about Time and the Nature of Eternity ...................................... 22 
§4.1 Relativity of Simultaneity ........................................................................................ 22 
§4.2 Conventionality of Simultaneity ............................................................................. 23 
§4.3 The Current State of Affairs .................................................................................... 24 
§5 Atemporal Eternity ........................................................................................................... 25 
§5.1 Absolute-Atemporality ............................................................................................. 26 
§5.1.1 Absolute-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity ........................... 28 
§5.2 Tensed-Atemporality ................................................................................................ 29 
§5.2.1 Tensed-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity .............................. 32 
§5.3 External-Atemporality .............................................................................................. 33 
§5.3.1 External-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity ............................ 35 
§6 Temporal eternity ............................................................................................................ 36 
§6.1 Transcendent-Eternity ............................................................................................. 36 
§6.1.1 Transcendent-Eternity and Special Theory of Relativity ............................ 38 
§6.2 Presentist-Eternity .................................................................................................... 40 
§6.2.1 Presentist-Eternity and Special Theory of Relativity .................................. 42 
§7 Summaries and Conclusions ............................................................................................ 43 
Appendix A – Two dimensional Diagram of the Twin Paradox ....................................... 44 
Cited Works ............................................................................................................................. 45 
Wider Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 48 
 
Finley Lawson Master of Research in Philosophy: Thesis 2013 
 3 
List of Abbreviations 
 
AA – Absolute Atemporality 
EA – External-Atemporality 
GTR – General Theory of Relativity  
Mst – Minkowski Spacetime 
NM – Newtonian Mechanics 
PE – Presentist Eternity 
PR – Principle of Relativity 
QM – Quantum Mechanics 
S&K – Stump and Kretzmann 
STR- Special Theory of Relativity 
TA – Tensed Atemporality 
TE – Transcendent Eternity 
  
Finley Lawson Master of Research in Philosophy: Thesis 2013 
 4 
§1 Overview 
Historically models of eternity have been grounded in divine attributes rather than 
the intrinsic structure of space-time. I examine the topology of Minkowski 
spacetime in comparison to the Euclidean space of Newtonian Mechanics, before 
highlighting five common approaches to eternity. Both atemporal and temporal 
models of eternity are examined to establish what they tell us about the nature of 
eternity outside the divine attributes, before being evaluated for their coherence 
with the Special Theory of Relativity.  
I argue that the most coherent models of eternity in light of the Special Theory of 
Relativity are those that appeal to metaphysical rather than physical time as it 
remains unaffected by the conventionality and relativity of simultaneity. I conclude 
that the special Theory of Relativity has a valid role to play in establishing the 
coherence of eternity. However, due to the discontinuity of concepts of time 
between the Special Theory of Relativity, the General theory of Relativity and 
Quantum Mechanics, it cannot singlehandedly be used to establish which models of 
eternity cohere with scientific models of time, but must be use alongside the 
General theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. 
§2 Background information for the Thesis 
There are almost as many models of god as there are believers in Him1 and the 
same can be said for models of eternity. A major reason for diverse notions of 
eternity within Christian philosophical theology is that the philosophical theologian 
has tended to start with God’s attributes and then formulate a model of eternity in 
which they are possible.  In the fourth to fourteenth centuries, when scholars were 
heavily influenced by Neo-Platonism, divine timelessness was the dominant theory. 
As the doctrine of divine immutability lost its appeal there was a rise in the 
everlasting model of God2. This has meant we have approached the issue with a 
theological prejudice3 making our model of eternity fit our doctrinal requirements, 
rather than establishing a coherent model of eternity from which we can examine 
which divine attributes are compossible. This has led to eternity becoming little 
                                                          
1  J. N. Findlay, ‘Time and Eternity’, The Review of Metaphysics, 32 (1978), 3–14 
<doi:10.2307/20127140>. 
2 Garrett J. DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, illustrated edition (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
2004). Pp.2-3 
3 This terminology is borrowed from Tim Maudlin who refers to our need to formulate our fundamental 
ontology without philosophical prejudice. cf. Tim Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics (OUP 
Oxford, 2009).  
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more than a litany of faith secondary to divine attributes4. Thus if we wish to make 
the claim “God is eternal” more than this ‘it must have some explicable meaning 
which we can understand’5 and it must ‘comport well with modern physics or it will 
not be taken seriously’6. It is within this framework that I will examine whether the 
theories of relativity have a role to play in forming a coherent model of eternity. 
§2.1 Models of Time 
Our understanding of eternity is influenced by our understanding of time, and 
bound up in the notion that if God created the universe then he must have either 
created time, or be a slave to it. If we claim God has an eternal mode of existence 
then there must be genuine metaphysical truths about eternity because otherwise 
eternity cannot be understood as a real feature of the universe. In order to 
understand the relationship between time and eternity, it is necessary to 
understand what we mean by “time”. Aristotle famously lamented ‘what, then, is 
time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am 
asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled’7. Brading8  seems to simplify the 
matter when she states that ‘there is no “every day” concept of time that we can 
make use of philosophically that is independent of the scientific concept: time as 
investigated by physics just is time as investigated by philosophy’ 9 . However, 
Besnard argues that there is no concept of time that works across all three 
fundamental physical theories1011.    
There are three major metaphysical views of time: Presentism, Possibilism, and 
Eternalism. Possibilism is the view that only the “now” is real; it stands like a knife 
edge on the division between the past and the future, and as such is constantly 
changing. This theory of dynamic time states that both the future and the past are 
equally unreal. In applying the same ontological status to the past and future, 
presentism is unable to encapsulate the asymmetries we perceive between them. 
Presentism is in direct contrast with Eternalism, which states that the present has 
                                                          
4 James F. Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’, International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, 22 (1987), 165–183 <doi:10.1007/BF00136015>. 
5 Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’. P.166 
6 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. P.15 
7 Augustine and R. S Pine-Coffin, Confessions (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York, N.Y., 
U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1961). Book XI, 14 
8 Katherine Brading, ‘Physically Locating the Present: a Case of Reading Physics as a Contribution to 
Philosophy’, 2012 <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9429/> [accessed 15 November 2012]. 
9 Brading, ‘Physically Locating the Present’. P.2 (original emphasis) 
10  Fabien Besnard, ‘Time of Philosophers, Time of Physicists, Time of Mathematicians’, 
arXiv:1104.4551, 2011 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4551> [accessed 30 November 2012]. P.18 
11 Special theory of Relativity, General Theory of Relativity, and Quantum Mechanics 
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no special ontological status; saying something is occurring “now” is no more 
significant than saying that it is occurring “here”. Eternalism claims that past, 
present and future are all equally real and the “passage” of time is only an illusion, 
seeming to correlate with the STR claim that “now” is relative to the observer12. 
Possibilism sits in the middle, claiming that whilst the past (and “now”) is “real”, 
the future is only possible. On this model time is dynamic and what is actual grows 
as the future “unfolds”.  
Two terms that need clarification are static and dynamic time. Static time states all 
moments of time co-exist, and with no ontological difference between the past, 
present and future.  The “passage” of time is nothing more than a feature of our 
psychology. The dynamic theory of time states that the present (and past) have a 
different ontological status to the future. Because the present (and past) are real, 
unlike the future, this means that the “passage” of time is a real feature of the 
world.  
McTaggart13 argued that there were two possible ways to discuss the positions of 
things in time; the A-Series and B-series. The A-series orders positions in time on 
the basis of their having the property of being two days future, one day future, 
present, one day past etc. As such A-series relations are constantly changing. 
Alternatively the B-series states that positions in time can be ordered according to 
their relative positions (x days later than, simultaneous with, x days earlier than), 
these relationships are static and hold no matter when in time you are speaking. 
McTaggart argues that the B-series alone cannot constitute a proper time series as 
there is no genuine change involved. Genuine change only occurs with the A-series, 
as the relationships of the B-series are fixed, whereas A-series relationships are 
constantly changing. However McTaggart believes that the A-series is inherently 
contradictory as it requires something to be able to hold all of the properties (being 
two days future, one day future, present etc.). This leads to McTaggart’s claim that 
time cannot be real as you cannot have time without real change (A-series) but the 
A-series is contradictory. Therefore all time (including both A and B-series) must be 
unreal and any appearances of temporal order is simply illusionary. 
The final issue is whether time as exists independent of events/objects within it. 
This is known as the debate between reductionism (with respect to time) and 
Platonism (with respect to time). Reductionism states that time does not exist 
                                                          
12 This claim will be examined in more detail in §3.3 
13 J. Ellis McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind, 17 (1908), 457–474 <doi:10.2307/2248314>. 
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independently of the events that occur within it, meaning all talk about time can 
be reduced to relationships between events/objects. Platonism states that time is 
like an empty container into which events can be placed, but that exists 
independently of what (if anything) is placed within it.  
DeWeese suggested a different approach to understanding time, by sub-dividing 
“time” into four different types. Rather than viewing these models in contrast to 
the earlier models, it is more helpful to view them as different ways we apply the 
concept of “time”. Physical (clock/measured) time refers to the laws of nature that 
allow for the measurement of time (i.e. are regular). This metric is dependent upon 
the laws of nature in a given temporal world and so is relative to a reference 
frame14. Cosmic (universal) time may or may not exist, however if it does exist, it is 
the standard by which all events in the universe could be located and referenced. 
Einstein argued that cosmic time did not exist, as time is entirely dependent on the 
reference frame 15 , and there is no privileged reference frame that shows the 
“ultimate” order. Personal (psychological) time is our conscious experience of (the 
passage of) time. Personal time cannot be global as it appears to differ from person 
to person. Nevertheless we all arrive at the end of a lecture at the same time 
irrespective of whether the lecture has passed “fast” or “slowly”. DeWeese 
highlights metaphysical time as a category of time that is fundamental to any other 
kind of time. Metaphysical time is a succession of moments through which concrete 
objects can be said to persist. It is not the same as physical time, as there could be 
concrete objects that are not physical, DeWeese argues that metaphysical time 
would be equivalent to “God’s time”. 
 
§2.2 Models of Eternity 
For the purposes of this essay eternity will not be understood as identical with 
sempiternity. Sempiternity simply means “existing at all times”16, and whilst there 
has been much discussion as to the relationship between sempiternity and 
                                                          
14 The relativity of the measurement of time will be examined in more detail in §4.2. For now it is 
simply worth noting that there is a question of the extent to which the measurement of time relates 
to the nature of time particularly regarding STR. 
15 the combination of your space-time location and world line [temporal history] 
16 This seems to be the accepted definition of sempiternity, and is provided by Kneale and others, 
however it does deviate from Boethius’ concept of sempiternity as ‘the perpetual running resulting 
from the flowing, tireless now’ (cf. Stump and Kretzmann, ‘Eternity’ P.431) which for the purposes of 
this essay I would consider to be akin to J. Harris’ argument for eternity as the specious present, and 
as such would be viewed as transcendent eternity, rather than sempiternity. 
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eternity17, it cannot be resolved without a clear definition of eternity. Secondly 
there is a distinction between atemporal and temporal models of eternity. 
Atemporal eternity can be understood in three ways: tensed-atemporality (TA posits 
that there is no temporal succession and eternity is entirely without extension or 
temporal location; absolute-atemporality (AA) posits that there is no temporal 
succession, but eternity is extended in some “special” way18; external-atemporality 
(EA) posits that eternity exists “outside” time in a way that is not encompassed in 
either TA or AA. Temporal eternity on the other hand can refer to the view that 
eternity is an unlimited “now” within which there may be temporal succession 
presentist-eternity (PE)19; the other model being examined is transcendent-eternity 
(TE) which refers to the view that eternity is not within our time however it still 
contains temporal succession. 
§3 Scientific Theories about Time and the Nature of Reality 
‘True revolutions in science involve more than spectacular discoveries and rapid 
advances in understanding. They also change the concepts on which the subject is 
based’20. There are four key scientific theories that have changed how we view 
space and time: Newtonian mechanics (NM), the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), 
the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), and quantum mechanics (QM). The scope of 
this thesis does not allow for an examination all of these theories. However, as NM 
produces a model of time that is the departure point for modern theories, and to a 
large extent mirrors our common sense understanding it will be examined in §3.1. 
QM with its varieties of interpretations would require more space than can be 
provided, therefore only the theories of relativity remain. It is true to say that GTR 
has superseded STR in many respects, it is able to account for the impact of bodies 
within spacetime on the structure of spacetime and it is perhaps one of the best 
confirmed theories of the twentieth century21. Equally it is true that if GTR is 
correct then STR cannot be, however it is not invalid as ‘just as Newtonian 
mechanics are a first approximation and accurate for non-relativistic velocities and 
non-astronomical distances, so STR is an accurate approximation for isolated or 
                                                          
17 M. Kneale, ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69 (1968), 223–238 
<doi:10.2307/4544777>. 
18 This use of the term differs from Padgett whose use of it is more in line with my definition of TA. He 
takes absolute-atemporality to mean there is no duration in the life of x, and it cannot be said to have 
extension or location in any time. 
19 Within this view I include authors such as J. Harris who argue that eternity can be understood as a 
specious present (and thus it is not without temporal succession and so isn’t atemporal) 
20 Paul Davies, ‘Introduction’, in Physics and Philosophy, by Werner Heisenberg (Penguin, 1989). P.vii 
21 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. P.75 
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medium-sized objects moving at uniform velocities or low accelerations’ 22 . 
Therefore given STR is most often cited in discussions of eternity, I will focus my 
discussion on the role of STR. 
§3.1 Newtonian Time and Space 
Everything that you need to know about Newton’s theories on time and space are 
contained within his first and second laws of motion 23 . The first law states: 
‘Everybody (sic) preserves in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, 
unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon’24. Although 
never explicitly discussed by Newton, the first law pre-supposes the existence of 
space with a geometric structure of Euclidean geometry called E3. This geometry 
requires space to have topology, affine structure and metrical structure. These can 
all be likened to the three instruments used in Euclidean geometry: pencil, 
straightedge and compass.  
The most fundamental aspect of space geometry is its topology, which provides the 
distinction between a single line in space and pair of disconnected lines. In order to 
distinguish between these within 3D space ‘the points in the space must have some 
geometrical organization’25. This geometry is known as “rubber-sheet geometry” as 
it allows for lines for be distorted: straight lines can become curves and vice versa, 
however intersecting lines will still intersect after transformation and a figure that 
is inside another will remain so after the transformation. Equally the geometry does 
not allow for the space to be “torn” or “pasted” such that a continuous line 
becomes several disconnected lines, or disconnected curves become a continuous 
curve. 
The affine structure of space is akin to the straightedge within Euclidean geometry. 
In order to be able to draw straight lines, there must be something that is different 
between a straight line and another kind of line within absolute space. The affine 
structure means that ‘every pair of points are end points of exactly one straight line 
and every finite line can be continued indefinitely in either direction’26. 
                                                          
22 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. P.76 
23 Tim Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics : Space and Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
P.4 
24 Isaac Newton, THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY (Illustrated and Extended 
with The History of the Ancient Physics and The History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics), 
Kindle edition. Loc. 1001 
25 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.6 
26 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.7 
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Finally it may have been noted that the affine structure is provided not by a ruler 
but a straightedge, therefore something else must provide the metric for space. 
This is provided by the compass as the circle is ‘the locus of points all equidistant 
from a given centre’27. In addition to attributing the E3 structure to his absolute 
space Newton held both that space existed at all times, and that ‘identically the 
same points of space persist through time’28. This belief explains how we are to 
understand the “state of rest” in the first law. An object is at rest so long as it 
occupies the same points of space over a given period of time.  
However the above geometry alone does not define what it means for an object to 
be in “uniform motion”. Uniform motion is making a claim about how long it takes 
for an object to complete that motion. Whilst the state of rest requires a metric to 
space, uniform motion requires a metric of time. Thus without understanding the 
metrical nature of time it is impossible to understand the concept of uniform 
motion and thus Newton’s first law.  
Unlike the three dimensions of absolute space, absolute time has only ‘a single, 
ordered sequence of instants that forms the totality of history’29. However just as 
absolute space has a metric that means it is possible to compare distance between 
points; the metric of absolute time allows us to compare lapsed time between 
instants. This enables us to say that the duration between I1 and I2 is the same as 
the duration between I2 and I3, but less than the duration between I1 and I3. In turn 
this means that we are then able to define absolute motion as ‘a motion that covers 
the same amount of space in the same time’30. 
The precise features of space and time are not explicitly discussed by Newton, 
however it is necessary that space has an E3 geometry and time has a metric. It is 
also important to make a distinction between absolute and relative time:  
Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature 
flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is 
called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and 
external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means 
                                                          
27 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.7 
28 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.10 
29 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.11 
30 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.11 
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of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a 
day, a month, a year31. 
Newton was a Platonist with respect to absolute time, and he equates relative time 
with measured time. The strength in the Newtonian model of time is even though 
neither absolute space nor absolute time are directly observable, the intuition of 
absolute time can be established from the fact that we are continually trying to 
make watches and clocks more accurate. Without absolute time the question has to 
be raised in respect to what do we want them to be “equal” or “constant”?  
Newton’s second law of motion provides us with the strongest evidence for absolute 
motion (and thus for absolute time and space). The second law of motion states 
that: ‘the alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed; 
and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed’32. 
The first law of motion provides us with an intuitive “proof” about the existence of 
absolute time and space, even if absolute motion isn’t observable, the forces acting 
upon the bodies in absolute motion are. Newton argues that absolute and relative 
motions are distinguished by the ‘forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion. 
True motion is neither generated nor altered, but by some force […] moved; but 
relative motion may be generated or moved without any force’33. This is because 
for relative motion to be noted the body being observed doesn’t have to move, 
instead the bodies it is being compared to may move instead.  
To illustrate his point Newton uses two examples that highlight ‘the forces of 
receding from the axis of circular motion’34 as they cannot be understood in terms 
of relative motion. The first experiment involves hanging a bucket filled with water 
by a twisted rope, and then letting the rope unwind thus spinning the bucket. As 
the rope unwinds the water changes from being flat, to gradually receding from the 
centre of the bucket and then up the sides, before becoming flat once again when 
the bucket stops spinning. This simple experiment disproves the relationist thesis 
proposed by Aristotle and Descartes that whilst there are many relative motions as 
a body can be compared to numerous other bodies, ‘the important physical motion 
of a body is its motion with respect to the body that immediately encloses it’35. 
According to the relativist account both when the bucket is still and when the 
                                                          
31 Newton. Loc.873 
32 Newton. Loc.1009 
33 Newton. Loc.946 
34 Newton. Loc.946 
35 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.22 
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bucket and water are spinning together the water is at rest in relation to the 
bucket. However the fact the water moves out from the centre and up the sides of 
the bucket would appear to suggest that the water can’t be considered truly at rest 
in both instances, only the first.  
The second example provides the clearest demonstration of absolute motion in the 
absence of relative motions: 
If two globes, kept at a given distance one from the other by means of a cord 
that connects them, were revolved about their common centre of gravity, we 
might, from the tension of the cord, discover the endeavour of the globes to 
recede from the axis of their motion […] even in an immense vacuum, where 
there was nothing external or sensible with which the globes could be 
compared 
The strength of this example lies in the fact that spinning is a motion, and as we 
have seen, in order to understand motion there needs to be something an object is 
moving in relation to. This point is relevant to our enquiry, because even though 
there is no longer a belief in absolute space and so therefore no belief in absolute 
motion, both the bucket and the globe experiments cannot be explained in terms of 
the relative motion of bodies. This means that even in STR the globes would show a 
tension that would show whether or not a force is being applied. Thus ‘even in 
Relativity, there is an absolute fact about whether or not the globes are rotating 
about their absolute centre of gravity’36. 
§3.2 Galilean Relativity: Moving Towards Spacetime 
Although absolute time and space are empirically unobservable, it is possible to 
remove the unobservability by changing the ontology of space and time. Whilst 
Newton defended the claim that it was possible to observe the absolute rotation of 
a system through absolute space, Galileo argued that it was impossible to detect 
uniform motion in a straight line through absolute space. Galileo’s proof lies in the 
results of experiments undertaken below decks on a ship: 
Shut yourself up with some friend in the main cabin […] and have with you 
there some flies, butterflies, and other small flying animals. Have a large 
                                                          
36 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.23 
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bowl of water with some fish in it; hang up a bottle that empties drop by drop 
into a wide vessel beneath it37 
Whether the ship is at a standstill or moving at a constant speed there is no 
difference in the experimental results and therefore no empirically observable 
difference in the two states of motion: 
The little animals fly with equal speed to all sides of the cabin. The fish swim 
indifferently in all directions; the drops fall into the vessel beneath; and in 
throwing something to your friend, you need throw it no more strongly in one 
direction than another the distances being equal; jumping with your feet 
together, you pass equal spaces in every direction38 
The claim that the outcome of the experiments, whether under motion or at rest, 
are the same is called Galilean relativity. Because the bodies don’t move in relation 
to each other, there is no way to establish the different states of motion. At the 
moment of writing this I ‘might be at absolute rest […] or moving at one million 
miles per hour through absolute space in the direction from earth to Alpha 
Centuri’39. However there is no way to establish which of these situations is true as 
absolute motion, in a straight line, cannot be established experimentally even 
though ‘whether a body is rotating or not, in some absolute sense, appears to have 
observable consequences’40. 
To move away from this contradiction we need to look at space and time in terms 
of Galilean space-time41. Whereas Newtonian space and time refer to two different 
kinds of things42 , Galilean space-time posits: ‘an event is essentially a place-in-
space-at-a-time […] a space-time point, which occurs only once, and, ideally has no 
spatial extension and takes up no time’43. 
Galilean space-time maintains Newtonian absolute time and so allows for a well-
defined metric. This means that Galilean space-time can be “foliated” into 
simultaneity slices. This foliation means that it is possible to tell objectively which 
                                                          
37 Galileo, Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems cited in Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. 
Pp.49-50 
38Galileo, Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems cited in Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. 
P.50 
39 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.52 
40 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.54 
41 I use “space-time” to refer to the Galilean model and “spacetime” to refer to the Minkowski 
spacetime of STR. 
42 Absolute space with infinitely many points and absolute time with infinitely many instants where the 
infinite space points persist through time. 
43 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.60 
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events occurred at the same time (i.e. had a lapsed time of zero) the regular 
metric ensures that the elapsed between the space-time slice t=1 and t=2 is the 
same as the space-time slice t=n and t=n+1. Whilst Galilean space-time maintains 
the spatial geometry of E3, it becomes specific to each simultaneity slice, due to 
the fact that points in space do not persist through time. Therefore ‘indicating that 
the events on the slice t=0 have the structure of E3 tells us nothing, in itself, about 
the geometry of events on t=1’44. Due to difficulties in explaining the observable 
phenomena of electromagnetism and light the Newtonian structure was replaced by 
STR. However before examining time within STR it is worthwhile to note how 
geometry and co-ordinates are used in the discussion of space and time.  
§3.2.1 Arithmetic, Geometry and Coordinates 
 Whilst neither Newtonian nor Galilean accounts of the geometry of space and time 
require discussion of co-ordinates, they are required for STR. Maudlin does not use 
equations to describe absolute space and time because Newton didn’t. Newton 
presented his theory using Euclidean geometry because motion in space is 
geometrical. The physical world is not made up of numbers but “physical 
magnitudes” and so geometry is more readily linked to the structure of the physical 
world than arithmetic. Even Einstein noted the difficulties in separating the “object 
of study” from the mathematical representation of physical reality. A clear example 
of this is that in many text books the geometry of Euclidean space is referred to not 
as E3 but R3. R3 whilst representing the same physical space has a specific 
mathematic meaning. It expresses elements of Euclidean space as a ‘set of ordered 
triples of real numbers’ 45 that whilst being mathematical objects of R3 are not 
physical elements of E3. 
The reason for the involvement of elements in R3 that do not correlate to points in 
E3 is due to the fact that R3 is a coordinate system that represents E3. The 
coordinates are used to encode the geometrical structure of E3, which in the case of 
Euclidean geometry involves Cartesian coordinates – every point has an x and y 
coordinate. The topology of the coordinate system must mesh with the topology of 
space it is describing. Therefore in dealing with Newtonian space it must have both 
an affine, metrical, and differential structure.  
Once a compatible coordinate system has been established it is possible to state the 
laws for that space in an algebraic form, however, as already noted one must be 
                                                          
44 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.61 
45 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.25 
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sure not to confuse the mathematical representation with physical reality. It is also 
possible to classify the type of coordinate system in relation to the geometrical 
structure of the space it is being used to describe. Such characterization however, 
does depend upon ‘the space itself, independently of all coordinates, having a 
certain geometrical structure’46.  
The requirement for an underlying geometrical structure also applies to being able 
to characterize a coordinate system as “inertial” or “non-inertial”. So far we have 
only assigned two numbers (or spatial coordinates) to our spatial “lines” (x, y). In E3 
a single event will have three spatial coordinates (x, y, z) and one time coordinate 
(t) giving a four figure coordinate for each event (t, x, y, z). The time coordinate 
relates to the time elapsed between events, therefore all events on a single 
simultaneity slice have the same time coordinate even though their spatial 
coordinates will differ. The spatial coordinates will only be comparable within a 
single simultaneity slice, as Galilean space-time does not hold to Newtonian 
absolute space. 
§3.3 Special Relativity Spacetime 
Einstein begins his discussion of STR with a basic example from which the 
implications of STR can be examined: 
I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is travelling uniformly, and 
drop a stone on the embankment […] I see the stone descend in a straight 
line. A pedestrian […] notices that the stone falls to earth in a parabolic 
curve47 
The question then becomes which of these observations is correct? This is where the 
concept of reference comes into play, as depending on whether one takes the 
carriage or the embankment as the “rigid body of reference”48, depends on the 
answer one will get. Although the concept of a coordinate system or reference 
frame is not a fundamental concept to STR, but derivative on the objective 
geometrical structure of space49, the response is dependent on what the system of 
coordinates is “attached” to 50 . This shows that ‘there is no such thing as an 
independently existing trajectory […], but only a trajectory relative to a particular 
                                                          
46 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.32 
47 Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, trans. by Robert W. Lawson, Kindle 
Edition (London: Routledge, 2001). Loc.163 
48 Einstein uses “rigid body of reference” interchangeably with “system of coordinates” 
49 See §3.3.2 
50 I.e. the embankment or the train 
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body of reference’ 51. In addition in order to arrive at a complete picture it is 
necessary to include an account of how this relates to time. In this instance, time is 
introduced by each observer (the one on the train and the one on the embankment) 
determining ‘the position on his own reference-body accompanied by the stone at 
each tick of the clock he is holding in his hand’52. 
The Principle of Relativity (PR) refers to relativity with respect to non-relativistic 
coordinate systems.  It is possible to reformulate the first law in terms of PR, 
resulting in: 
If a mass m is moving uniformly in a straight  line with respect to a co-
ordinate system K, then it will also be moving in a straight line relative to a 
second co-ordinate system K’ 
This implies that if K is understood in terms of a Galilean coordinate system, K’ 
must be too in order that natural phenomena adhere to the same laws in K and K’. 
PR (in the restricted sense) refers to this trans-coordinate correlation. If restricted 
PR does not hold it leads to a situation where the laws that govern natural 
phenomena in coordinate systems that are moving relative to each other, such as 
the carriage and the embankment, will not be the same. For example if we 
understand the embankment coordinate system at rest (K), and the carriage 
coordinate system moving relative to it (K0) then it appears that less simple laws 
would apply to natural phenomena in K than in K0 ‘due to the fact that the carriage 
would be in motion (i.e. “really”) with respect to K0’53. The movement of one 
system in relation to another can be viewed as analogous to the Earth’s rotation 
around the sun, and yet ‘the most careful observations have never revealed such 
anisotropic properties in terrestrial physical space’. It seems reasonable to hold to 
the validity of PR until one tries to reconcile it with the constancy of the speed of 
light 54. If a ray of light propagated along the embankment is travelling with a 
velocity of c55 and PR states the speed of light must be the same irrespective of our 
                                                          
51 Einstein. Loc.171 
52 Einstein. Loc.181 
53 Einstein. Loc.225 
54 Note: this is not the same as saying that light has a terminal velocity; it is simply the claim that light 
travels at the same speed in a vacuum irrespective of the speed of the object propagating it or the 
direction in which it is propagated. 
55 Approximately 300,000km/second in a vacuum, for the purposes of this example it is expedient to 
imagine that the air directly above the embankment has been removed and so the light ray is 
travelling in a vacuum. 
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rigid body of reference56, then a ray of light propagated in the carriage must be 
travelling at the same speed. However if the ray of light in the carriage travelling in 
the direction of the light is given speed (v) and the velocity of light relative to the 
embankment has speed (w) then the velocity of the ray of light from the reference 
of the carriage is w=c-v. But this means from the reference point of the carriage 
the light is travelling at less than c, and therefore the speed of light is not 
constant.  
§3.3.1 Introducing Time into Spacetime 
If two lightning bolts hit either end of the embankment (at A and B) can my 
assertion that the two events were simultaneous be said to make sense? Within 
physics simultaneity ‘does not exist for the physicist until he has the possibility of 
discussing whether or not it is fulfilled in an actual case’57. This means that any 
definition of simultaneity must also provide the method for establishing if it true. 
This leads to an apparent logical circularity requiring that we are able to measure 
time before we can say whether or not two events are simultaneous, but this is not 
necessarily the case58. However if we assume that the velocity of light travels from 
A to M at the same rate it travels from B to M it is possible to define a method of 
establishing simultaneity. An observer is placed at the mid-point of 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵���� (M), with an 
arrangement of mirrors such that A and B are visually observable at the same time. 
‘If the observer perceives the two flashes of lightning at the same time, then they 
are simultaneous’59. ‘In reality it assumes absolutely nothing about light’60 it only 
provides a conception that can be empirically fulfilled. 
This leads to a definition of time within physics. If clocks of identical construction 
are placed at A, M and B of the embankment (coordinate system), then the time of 
an event correlates to the reading61 given by the clock in the immediate spatial 
vicinity of the event. This provides us with absolute simultaneity from the point of 
the embankment. However, in order to examine the impact a moving body of 
reference has on simultaneity, it is necessary to return to the double lightning 
strike on the embankment as viewed from the carriage. If an observer was 
positioned in the carriage moving in the direction of 𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵���� such that at the time of the 
                                                          
56 Due to the fact that both coordinate systems must be Galilean and therefore the laws of natural 
phenomenon must be the same in both reference frames.  
57 Einstein. Loc.293 
58 This is known as the conventionality of one-way velocity (examined in more detail in §4.2) 
59 Einstein. Loc.302 
60 Einstein. Loc.302 
61 Position of the hands 
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lightning strike they were at M, they would not perceive the events at A and B as 
simultaneous. The reason for the lack of simultaneity is due to the fact that they 
are moving towards the light source at B and so the light from B has less far to 
travel, therefore it will reach them before the flash from A. This means that ‘every 
reference body […] has its own particular time; unless we are told the reference-
body to which the statement of time refers; there is no meaning in a statement of 
the time of the event’6263. 
§3.3.2 Finding the Geometrical Structure of Minkowski Spacetime 
So far time in STR has been defined time in terms of clocks, and as seen in §2.1 
measured time is only one (non-fundamental) kind of time, dependent on the 
structure of the spacetime it is being used to measure. This understanding appears 
to be derivative of the underlying nature of spacetime rather than a fundamental 
element of it. In fact it would be fair to say that ‘“clock” is evidently not the sort 
of term that should appear in a fundamental physical law […] nature does not have 
to settle whether any given mechanism counts as a “clock” in order to determine 
how it should behave’64.  
However, it is possible to view the “clock” not as measuring the passage of absolute 
time, but as measuring something else. What is being measured must be an 
absolute “thing” as if two identical, accurate clocks are placed side by side they 
measure something off at the same rate. What they are measuring is not the 
passage of absolute time, but their passage (or trajectory) through spacetime. 
Therefore much as an odometer on two cars driving side by side will tick over at the 
same rate, but will show a different reading if one car takes a different route to 
the end point, the same is true of two clocks travelling though Mst. This is called 
the Clock hypothesis: 
Clock Hypothesis: The amount of time that an accurate clock shows to have 
elapsed between two events is proportional to the Interval along the clocks 
trajectory between those events, or, in short, clocks measure the Interval 
along their trajectories65 
                                                          
62 Einstein. Loc.347 
63 The need for a reference frame in order to make sense of judgements about time can be seen to be 
mirrored in Nelson’s work on internal and external questions. This link will be examined in more detail 
in§5.2 
64 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.106 
65 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.76 (capitalization occurs in original) 
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It is this hypothesis that can account for the famous twin paradox without recourse 
to any mention of the speed of light, or the passage of time being slower/faster: 
Two twins, with identically constructed clocks, begin in a situation where 
they are side by side in rocket ships and subject to no forces. Twin A briefly 
turns on his engines, then turns them off. The twins drift apart. After a while, 
twin A again fires his engines, but in the opposite direction. He eventually 
drifts back twin B, who has never fired his engines. Twin A fires his engines a 
third time, coming back to relative rest with respect to twin B. When the 
twins compare their clocks, they find that twin B’s clock has run off more 
time than twin A’s. Furthermore, twin B appears to be biologically older than 
twin A.66 
Whilst it may appear from a space-time diagram of the situation67 that there is a 
paradox as Twin B’s line “appears” to be longer, the reason the twins’ clocks 
register different times is due to the fact that the ‘clocks measure the Interval 
along their world-lines [trajectory through Mst], and B’s world line between o 
[point of origin] and q [end point] is longer than A’s. Period. There is nothing more 
to say’68. Having established that “clocks” measure their trajectory rather than 
absolute space, in order to understand how the temporal metric works within Mst 
the Clock Hypothesis needs to be combined with The Law of Light and the 
Relativistic Law of inertia. These additional laws expand on the behaviour of light 
in a vacuum: ‘the trajectory of light in a vacuum is independent of the physical 
state of its source’69.  
If one bears in mind that there is no physical structure in a vacuum except the 
structure of Mst itself, this implies that: the trajectory of light rays are determined 
solely by the geometry of Mst. This means that if a light is emitted at P then the 
structure of MSt should define where the light emitted will go (no matter the 
direction it is emitted in), the points where light might go from P is called the 
future light-cone of P. Likewise the points in space from which it is possible that 
light emitted might reach P is called the backward light-cone of P. This rule that 
every event in MSt must have both a forward and backward light-cone replaces the 
foliation Galilean space-time:  
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67 See Appendix A 
68 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.79 (capitalization occurs in original) 
69 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.68 (original emphasis) 
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Law of Light: The trajectory of a light ray emitted from an event (in a 
vacuum) is a straight line on the future light cone of that event.70 
As Mst has the same underlying affine structure as E3 it is possible to restate 
Newton’s first law of motion so that it applies to Minkowski rather than Galilean 
spacetime: 
Relativistic Law of Inertia: The trajectory of any physical entity subject to no 
external influence is a straight line in Minkowski space-time71 
These three laws establish what observable behaviour can be expected from 
physical items due to the (unobservable) geometrical structure of Mst. Therefore 
just the temporal metric of E3 was explained through the compass, the temporal 
metric of MSt (and relativity of simultaneity) can be understood through the Clock 
Hypothesis. In order to understand the relativity of simultaneity, we need a 
collection of ideal clocks. If the following experiment were to be performed in E3 it 
would be enough that the collection of clocks started and ended in the same 
simultaneity slices as each other to know that they would display the same amount 
of elapsed space. However in MSt it is more important to know the trajectory the 
clock took between the two points. 
The twin paradox shows the importance of trajectory, so it is necessary for the 
collection of cocks to be co-moving. In order for the clocks to be co-moving they 
must be on inertial trajectories neither moving closer together nor further apart 
from each other. One clock is nominated as the master-clock from which all others 
are synchronised; it is also used to establish that the collection of clocks is co-
moving72. Having established a collection of co-moving clocks it is necessary to 
calibrate and synchronise them. The clocks are calibrated by stating that the 
master-clock emits a light ray every minute, this then gives us a unit of 
measurement with which to work. If we take it that the round trip of the light ray 
takes 2 minutes, then the co-moving clocks would have to adjust their reading so 
that on receiving the light ray they showed I minute later than the time signature 
(the time it was released from the  master clock) of the light ray. Once this is done 
the clocks are calibrated (each is “ticking at the same rate”). 
                                                          
70 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.75 
71 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.75 
72 In order to establish whether a clock is co-moving to the master-clock an observer sends out light 
rays from the master-clock towards the target clock. If the round trip (i.e. to the target clock and 
back) takes the same amount of time for each measurement then the clocks are co-moving, if the 
round trip time increases/decreases  the target clock is moving away from/towards the master-clock. 
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It is the final step that synchronizes the clocks that leads to “problems” with 
simultaneity. In synchronizing the clocks there is no absolute foliation, therefore 
establishing simultaneity is dependent on convention73. Whilst there is no singular 
way to establish simultaneity, some conventions are simpler than others. For 
example synchronizing the master clock and target clock means only that I have to 
ensure that (given the two minute round trip time) if the master-clock reads 12:00 
when the first light ray is emitted, the target clock will read 12:01 when it receives 
the ray, and the master-clock will read 12:02 when the signal returns. If every clock 
is adjusted to this convention then it is possible to say that two events are 
simultaneous. However, given the arbitrary choice of master clock, as well as the 
convention for synchronising the clocks it would be more correct to say that they 
occur on ‘equal t-slices’ 74  rather than simultaneity slices. This is particularly 
important given the fact that if we opt for a different master/target clock the t-
slices will be different. 
The most obvious way to show the lack of an objective account for simultaneity in 
Mst is by choosing to calibrate the co-moving collection from a different master-
clock (master-clockm). Master-clockm is moving away from the master-clock and will 
be calibrated with target-clockm. It is equally valid to pick master-clockm as the 
calibrating clock given our initial choice was arbitrary. Having chosen master-clockm 
establishing and synchronising a collection of co-moving clocks is the same. Both 
collections would enable a t-coordinate to be assigned to any event in Mst. So far 
nothing complex has happened due to this taking place in Mst. The geometry of Mst 
comes into play if observerm tried to correlate his t-slices with observero (the 
original observer). If simultaneity was a genuine feature of Mst as it is in Galilean 
space-time only one of the collections of t-slices would be correct.  This is not the 
case for Mst. If we compared timings for observero and observerm of event x the 
                                                          
73 The conventionality of simultaneity has been much debated and has yet to be definitively settled 
one way or another (see: Allen Janis, ‘Conventionality of Simultaneity’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2010, 2010 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/spacetime-convensimul/> [accessed 7 
November 2012].;David Malament, ‘Causal Theories of Time and the Conventionality of Simultaneity’, 
Noûs, 11 (1977), 293–300 <doi:10.2307/2214766>; Sahotra Sarkar and John Stachel, ‘Did Malament 
Prove the Non-Conventionality of Simultaneity in the Special Theory of Relativity?’, Philosophy of 
Science, 66 (1999), 208–220 <doi:10.2307/188643>; Adolf Grünbaum, ‘David Malament and the 
Conventionality of Simultaneity: A Reply’, 2001 <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/184/> [accessed 27 
September 2013]; John A. Winnie, ‘Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part I’, 
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conventionality of simultaneity.  
74 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.90 
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equal t-slices would not correlate. It would appear that observerm’s clock would be 
“running slow” from the perspective of observero. Yet the symmetry of the situation 
means observero’s clock would appear to be “running slow” from the perspective of 
observerm. Because there is no foliation in Mst, there is no “correct” time for x, it is 
entirely dependent upon the (arbitrary) choice of a master-clock (coordinate 
system).  
This phenomenon is known as “time dilation” and is based in the choice of 
coordinates, and it shows that ‘the key claim of Relativity is the nonexistence of 
simultaneity as a real physical relation among events’ 75. It is this lack of the 
objectivity of simultaneity that brings STR into debates about the nature of 
eternity. The key thing to note is that light, in and of itself has no speed, because 
without absolute space and time there is no way to establish an absolute velocity. 
Light only has an absolute speed in relation to a particular coordinate system.  
§4 Scientific Theories about Time and the Nature of Eternity 
Science has nothing to say about the concept of eternity, science only provides us 
with models of time that accurately describe the effects of spacetime ontology on 
observable phenomena within given parameters. Theology on the other hand gives 
us explanations of eternity that satisfy some or all of our doctrinal requirements 
regarding divine attributes. So how do scientific theories of time contribute to 
coherent theological/philosophical models of eternity? The answer lies in all models 
of eternity being grounded in theories about the nature and reality of time, either 
implicitly or explicitly. These assumptions can be held up against STR spacetime to 
see if they stay coherent. Whilst there are many scientific models of time, it is STR 
that is most often called in to validate or expand or theories of eternity. There are 
two major issues that arise from STR: the relativity of simultaneity and the 
conventionality of simultaneity. In §5 and §6 I will examine each model of eternity 
from §2.2 against these challenges to see if any are able to cohere with STR.  
§4.1 Relativity of Simultaneity 
Simultaneity can be understood as a structure that may or may not be intrinsic to 
spacetime that can be used to organize events76. If simultaneity can be defined 
entirely in terms of the structure of spacetime it can be understood as an absolute 
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76 Domenico Giulini, ‘Uniqueness of Simultaneity’, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
52 (2001), 651–670 <doi:10.2307/3541912>. 
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relation. However in STR it is no longer possible to definitively state that two 
events occurred simultaneously: ‘every reference-body […] has its own particular 
time; unless we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, 
there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an event’77. Thus there is ‘no 
absolute fact to whether two spatially separated events are simultaneous’78. This 
leads to an incompatibility between STR and presentism, summed up in the 
incompatibility of the following premises: 
(P1) All and only things that exist now are real 
(P2) Special relativity is a complete account of spatiotemporal structure 79 
If STR is “taken seriously” and viewed as a complete account of spatiotemporal 
structure it rules out (P1). (P1) becomes incoherent due to the following argument: 
in STR an event E1 is “now” relative to itself and there is no way, intrinsic to the 
geometry of Mst, to establish which events distant to E1 are “now” relative to it. 
The problem of a “correct” way to establish a simultaneity slice is summed up in 
the conventionality of simultaneity (see §4.2). Instead we are dependent on the 
relativity of simultaneity, where choice of a “preferred plane of simultaneity” is 
not due to the fundamental ontology of MSt.  
Attempts to maintain both (P1) and (P2) lead to extreme solipsism. This is because 
if there is no determinate way to establish which events are “now” relative to E1 
then there no other events that are determinately real relative to E1. Therefore 
nothing is real relative to E1 except E1, and yet due to the fact that every event En 
is real relative to itself it leads to pluralistic extreme solipsism. The preferred 
Scientific and philosophical option at this point is to reject presentism (P1) outright 
and adopt a “block universe” (eternalist) theory of time.   
§4.2 Conventionality of Simultaneity  
Simultaneity does not exist for the physicist until ‘he has the possibility of 
discovering whether or not it is fulfilled in an actual case’80. This is evidenced in 
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78 John D. Norton, ‘Special Theory of Relativity: Relativity of Simultaneity’, Lecture Notes: Einstein 
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79  Katherine Brading, ‘Presentism as an Empirical Hypothesis’, 2012 <http://philsci-
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the clock hypothesis81 where it is assumed that the speed of the light ray travelling 
from the master clock to the target clock is the same as when it travels from the 
target clock back to the master clock. The very notion of simultaneity is established 
on an (unverifiable) convention that the speed of light is constant. 
The speed of light is empirically unverifiable because in order to establish the 
speed of light between the master clock and the target clock we need to know both 
the distance between them and the time it takes for the light to travel. However in 
order to establish the amount of time it takes light to travel between the two 
clocks they need to be synchronised, ‘but to synchronize the clocks the one-velocity 
(sic) of light should be known beforehand’82. The importance of this is that not only 
is the one-way speed of light a convention but ‘the conventionality […] implies 
conventionality of the simultaneity of events as well’83. The fact that relativity is 
shown to be conventional and frame dependent means there is nothing in the 
objective structure of Mst that corresponds to absolute simultaneity84. There is no 
absolute or objective measure of simultaneity (relativity of simultaneity), which 
implies that simultaneity is only a matter of convention. The reverse is also true, 
there being no objective measure of simultaneity means that ‘different observers 
[…] are not forced […] to share the same class of simultaneous events, which means 
simultaneity is not absolute and is therefore relative’85. The crux of the matter is 
that in the case of three-dimensional space simultaneity as convention would not 
be possible due to the existence of an objective measure of which events are 
simultaneous.  
§4.3 The Current State of Affairs 
As can be seen from §2.2 there is a wide diversity in how eternity is understood. 
The above divisions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; however they represent 
a divergence in beliefs about the ontological status of eternity. Whilst much of the 
literature that deals with eternity in a way that is, at some level, distinct from the 
divine attributes dates back to the 1970’s, the modern work of scholars such as 
Brading 86 , Le Poidevin 87  and Besnard 88 , has provided rigorous work linking 
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philosophical and scientific discussions of time. The fact that this development has 
occurred alongside a drive to bring new perspectives to bear on the traditional 
problems of philosophy of religion89, means that whilst there isn’t necessarily a 
large body of literature on role of science in understanding eternity, there are 
collective bodies of work looking both at the role of science in our understanding of 
time, and applying scientific understanding to philosophy of religion.  
This evaluation is not exhaustive of existing arguments for eternity; however it 
provides a broad spectrum of the current approaches to eternity. Although I have 
aimed to avoid models in which the concept of God is not entirely separable from 
eternity, on occasions this isn’t possible. Where this is the case I have adopted a 
convention of replacing “God” with “E-entity”. This allows for the discussion of 
models of eternity that require a “life” or “being” without imposing the 
metaphysical baggage of “God” on to the discussion. The E-entity may or may not 
have the attributes associated with the Judeo-Christian God, but it is possibly safer 
to understand it as a non-physical, conscious being.  
§5 Atemporal Eternity 
Atemporality means that there is no way to order time, there can be no before or 
after in an atemporal eternity. This applies not only to events within eternity, but 
also to temporal-eternal relations as any ordering of events brings eternity into a 
temporal series and thus reduces it to endless temporality (sempiternity). 
Atemporality equates to the traditional view of timelessness. Both Absolute and 
Tensed Atemporality provide ways in which we can understand the relationship 
between eternal and temporal events in light of the lack of succession within 
atemporality. External-Atemporality provides a different model of atemporal 
eternity that spans the atemporal/temporal divide.  
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§5.1 Absolute-Atemporality 
Stump and Kretzmann’s (S&K) conception of eternity is based on Boethius’ assertion 
that eternity is ‘the complete possession all at once of illimitable life’ 90. They 
argue that this definition can be broken down into four claims. The first claim is 
that something cannot be eternal if it does not have life, meaning numbers, 
necessary truths etc. can only be considered atemporal not eternal. The second 
claim implicit in Boethius’ definition is that the life held by the E-entity cannot be 
limited. On the stronger interpretation of this claim it is impossible for there to be 
either a beginning or an end to the life. The third claim is about duration, S&K 
argue that the kind of duration required by “illimitable life” is a special kind of 
duration; ‘beginningless, endless, infinite duration’ 91 . Although duration is a 
necessary attribute of anything that is to be called “life” it is necessary to 
understand this special kind of duration before examining the fourth claim “the 
complete possession all at once”.  A temporal life cannot be said to be possessed all 
at once because it is sequential, likewise it cannot be completely possessed 
because at any instant some events are past and some future and therefore not 
within the possession of the temporal entity. Thus the E-entity’s “life” must have 
atemporality as well as duration. 
S&K argue at this point that it is “evident” that although there is no temporal 
sequence ‘it does not rule out the attribution of presentness or simultaneity to the 
life and relationships’92 of an E-entity. This needs a little unpacking but can be tied 
into the requirement of the E-entity having “life” and consequently “existing”. The 
problem with attaching “life” to the definition of eternity is that unless that life 
consists only of a single event, it must have a “present” existence. As the only 
existence it has is present (“all at once”) the only relationship that can obtain 
between events in its life is one of simultaneity. For S&K, this present cannot be 
the present that we are familiar with in the temporal sense as that is a durationless 
instant93. As AA provides a view of eternity as a limitless duration the temporal 
understanding of the present does not work and cannot be extended without 
bringing concepts of temporal succession to bear upon it. Therefore this eternal 
                                                          
90 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. by H. R. JAMES, Kindle 
Edition, 2012. Book V, pr. VI 
91 Stump and Kretzmann. P.433 
92 Stump and Kretzmann. P.434 
93 It should be noted that Stump and Kretzmann unquestioningly adopt the presentist understanding of 
time where “now” is the knife edge instant between the past and present. 
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present is one in which all events occur E-simultaneously: the events exist or occur 
‘at one and the same eternal present’94.  
The problem is that whilst events within eternity and events within time can be 
understood as being simultaneous when they occur/exist at one and the same time 
(co-occur in time)or the same eternal present (co-occur in eternity);the same 
cannot be said when one event is eternal and the other is temporal (ET-
simultaneity). The problem with ET-simultaneity is that there is nothing in which 
the events can co-occur. They cannot co-occur in time as that would reduce 
eternity to time, and they cannot co-occur in eternity as this would reduce time to 
eternity. S&K’s version of AA highlights the dependence of models of eternity on 
our understanding of time. Their model of AA is dependent on the both the notion 
of absolute simultaneity and understanding time in terms of the presentist model. 
In order for there to be absolute simultaneity S&K adopt Newtonian absolute 
time95.  
However AA, as S&K conceive it, requires that duration without temporal extension 
is far more than “empty time”. They argue that analysis of the concept of time 
shows that our experience of duration is illusionary, given that nothing is real 
except the present, so nothing can endure. Genuine duration must involve 
atemporal duration as only then is it possible for something to be fully realized in 
an existence where no part of it has either gone out of existence or is yet to come 
into existence. Eternity is the only way in which duration can be fully realized. The 
rest of their argument for eternity as the “possession of illimitable life all at once” 
is based on this understanding of eternity. The issue for S&K is that they are 
committed to presentist metaphysics, because they require an absolute present; 
without which they would have to accept some form of relativity and seemingly lose 
any possibility of simultaneity. They require simultaneity because they are 
committed to preserving free will in face of omniscience, and this commitment 
stems from creating a model of eternity around divine attributes.  
There is perhaps another way to understand absolute atemporality, although it 
requires an E-entity to perceive our temporal existence.  Sutherland96 is talking 
specifically about omniscience, but I feel that his description can be used to 
                                                          
94 Stump and Kretzmann. P.435 
95 For a detailed examination of what is required by Newtonian time see §3.1. The implications of a 
non-Newtonian view of spacetime on this version of AA will be discussed in §5.1.1  
96 Stewart R. Sutherland, ‘God, Time and Eternity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79 (1978), 
103–121 <doi:10.2307/4544936>. 
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understand how eternality differs as of mode of existence from temporality. 
Sutherland argues not only is foreknowledge impossible from an atemporal 
perspective, but so is the temporal ordering of experience. From a temporal 
perspective part of the way in which we distinguish between our knowledge of the 
past and present is that we know the latter with more certainty. Our temporal 
knowledge is based on distinctions between past, present, and future, but if our E-
entity is said to know everything, then there cannot be these gradations of 
certainty in knowledge. If everything is immediately distinct and clear, then 
Sutherland argues that ‘remembering’ and direct experience cannot be 
distinguished, and in this way it would seem that whilst there could be duration in 
an atemporal existence, the atemporality stems from a feature of the experience of 
eternality rather than something which is intrinsic to eternity itself. 
Sutherland’s understanding of eternality provides us with a model that ties into 
Brading’s argument97 that “now” is not an actual feature of time rather it is a 
psychological one. It would also seem that this could be attached to Nelson’s model 
to start building up a more detailed picture of atemporality as a mode of existence. 
The question that still remains is how an atemporal eternity can be said to relate to 
our temporal universe, of which it would seem that a spacetime framework is a 
fundamental and inseparable aspect. 
§5.1.1 Absolute-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity 
S&K employ STR as a purely heuristic device in order to explain the difficulties of 
defining ET-Simultaneity. However this does not mean that their version of AA is 
impervious to the challenges of the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity. 
Whilst S&K don’t explicitly adopt a particular model of time, their motivation for 
understanding eternity as an atemporal duration is based on dissatisfaction with the 
conception of “now” found in presentism. 
S&K argue that our experience of the (specious) present is illusionary, and that 
given the impossibility of true duration in temporality, it can only be understood 
from an atemporal perspective. Therefore in order to experience life “all at once” 
the E-entity must be atemporal. I would argue that there is nothing contradictory 
between STR and understanding “now” as specious with regards our experience of 
time. However there is no correlate between the structure of Mst and a fixed 
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“now”, so it could be argued that the requirement for an absolute eternal “now” 
forces eternity to be atemporal in the face of STR. 
The second requirement for S&K’s conception of AA is that “life” is experienced 
simultaneously and simultaneity is problematic with STR due to the conventionality 
thesis. Additional simultaneity difficulties arise due to the fact that whilst eternity 
is atemporal, the “world” they want experienced as “all at once” is temporal and 
does have its simultaneity relations affected by STR. In their discussion of eternity 
they claim that absolute time is not ruled out by STR as ‘every conscious temporal 
observer has an undeniable, indispensable sense of the absolute present’98. Not 
only does Harris argue against the absolute now (on the basis of our experience) but 
also this notion of the absolute present deviates from the Newtonian view of the 
present as absolute. On S&K’s interpretation the absolute present is reduced to an 
aspect of our psychological experience of time. If we reduce time to psychological 
time, then there are no metaphysical truths to be discovered about either the 
nature of eternity or time because time isn’t real. If time is merely an aspect of our 
psychological experience then eternity understood as atemporality is simply a 
duration of time which contains no conscious being.  
Sutherland’s version of AA explicitly reduces the present to a matter of 
psychological time. Psychological atemporality is not affected by the topology of 
Mst as it isn’t an objective feature of reality. I feel the crux of the matter for both 
models is that they reduce atemporal duration/ “now” to a feature of psychological 
time upon which our scientific view of time has no bearing. This in turn prevents 
eternity being a real ontological feature of reality, and therefore it would appear 
that AA is a psychological feature of a temporal mode of existence. This would 
mean that further questions need to be raised about the effects of STR on 
sempiternally existing objects/events.  
§5.2 Tensed-Atemporality  
A second model of eternity that also adheres to atemporality as excluding 
succession is Tensed-Atemporality (TA).  TA is developed by Nelson99 as a model of 
eternity that is ‘without extension of any sort’100. Nelson’s model is unique in that 
he goes to great lengths to establish how it may be possible to understand what it is 
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timelessness. 
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Finley Lawson Master of Research in Philosophy: Thesis 2013 
 30 
for something to exist alongside, but temporally unrelated to our universe. In order 
understand what might be said of something temporally unrelated to us Nelson 
examines the kinds of questions it would be possible to ask about temporal relations 
in our universe (Alpha) and between that of an identical but temporally unrelated 
universe (Beta). 
Beta is not physically, temporally or spatially related to Alfa. No temporal 
framework encompasses both Alpha and Beta, and nothing of Alpha can be said to 
be before, after or simultaneous with anything on Beta (and vice versa). No 
duration on Alpha is longer or shorter than a duration on Beta nor is there a 
common now to Alpha and Beta.  
Nelson argues that there are three kinds of questions that can be asked about 
temporal relations on Alpha and Beta pseudo, internal and external. Pseudo 
questions of time try to relate events from different universes within a singular 
temporal sequence and are meaningless: I.e. did the car crash on Alpha happen 
before or after the president was elected on Beta? (From Alpha) What time is it now 
in Beta (or vice versa)? All these questions invoke trans-universal or absolute 
temporal relations between the universes. Any such question must be rejected as 
they have no correct answers.  Thus TA can be seen to deny the existence of a 
cosmic time that spans both universes. 
Internal questions of time are questions that must be raised and answered within 
the same temporal universe: Is Alpha-Fred Still Alive? This can only be raised and 
answered on Alpha (or on Beta if about Beta-Fred) otherwise it becomes a pseudo 
question. Internal questions are about a single frame of reference, and are located 
in the same temporal reference frame that they refer to. Internal questions could 
therefore refer to cosmic time within an individual universe, as there is nothing 
which prevents this from being the case. However whilst this would allow for 
cosmic time along the lines outlined by DeWeese, it would not be possible to allow 
for a  metaphysical time that was basic to all other kinds of time as this would 
imply that there is some time of trans-universal measurement of time. 
External questions of time can be asked in or outside a temporal reference frame: 
I.e. did the car crash in New York and the election of Cameron happen at the same 
time? As both the events occur in the same temporal reference frame the question 
can be asked by those on Alpha and Beta. The ability to pose and answer external 
questions would appear to imply that there is an intra-universe cosmic time that 
allows for genuine simultaneity to take place, whether this cosmic time is to be 
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understood in terms of absolute time, or as some kind of privileged reference frame 
is not clear. The clearest way to understand this is to allow for both universes to 
have physical time that is also cosmic time for that universe. However this does not 
mean that external questions would not be valid if STR holds, only that there would 
then be questions as to what extent it is possible to say that the two events are 
simultaneous due to the lack of absolute simultaneity. 
Moving beyond the kinds of questions we can ask about a temporally unrelated 
universe, Nelson argues that when we claim “Beta exists” we are not making a 
claim about Beta’s existence in our past or future, it is used in a logically tenseless 
sense. Importantly when we say Beta EXISTS101 we are not even locating it within its 
own internal temporal reference frame as the claim that Beta is ‘rules out a 
universal frame of temporal reference within which one might use a tensed 
statement locating [it’s] existence’102. To say that something tenselessly exists is 
not to claim it exists sempiternally or even that the statement is always true. 
Rather that they ‘neither express nor imply any temporal relation between these 
statements and the actions, events, or things referred to in them or described by 
them’103. Thus to say that eternity EXISTS, is not to make any claim about eternity’s 
pre-existence to our temporal universe or about its ongoing existence in the future.  
By not implying any temporal relation between the statement/knowledge of what 
exists and the object existing, this kind of timelessness (atemporality) can be 
understood as correlating to the traditional model of timelessness (or as Nelson 
terms it Weak –Timelessness). 
However TA is making a stronger claim than weak timelessness. What TA provides is 
a model whereby not only is eternity not temporally related to our temporal 
system, but ‘it does not itself lie in any temporal system and is not itself temporally 
ordered or located at all’ 104 . Furthermore, whilst the Alpha-Beta relationship 
provides an initial route to enable understanding ‘a reality temporally unrelated to 
Alpha’105 without the complications of strong timelessness, it does not mirror the 
temporal-eternity relationship fully. In order to mirror the temporal-eternal 
relationship an omniscient, omnipotent realtor of Alpha and Beta is introduced, 
however for the purposes of this thesis the E-entity will suffice to fulfill this role.  
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The E-entity is not located temporally, physically or spatially within either Alpha or 
Beta; in saying the E-entity exists, exists is to be understood tenselessly and 
without any connotations of its existing at any time in either Alpha or Beta. The 
fact that the E-entity is not located in either temporal reference frame means that 
only external questions can be answered about Alpha or Beta from the E-entity’s 
perspective. Further even if the E-entity was understood to have created both 
universes and have knowledge of events in them, the knowledge could not be 
collated into a single temporally ordered sequence even in a ‘uniquely divine frame 
of temporal reference’106. 
It is the E-entity that provides the TA model for eternity as ‘without extension of 
any sort’107. This is in contrast to AA which requires duration, even if it is a “special 
sort”. This is where TA and AA diverge as TA highlights the “otherness” of eternity 
in comparison to time, without any extension or duration it leads to an eternity 
that is of ‘neither infinitely long nor instantaneously short duration’108. The main 
advantage of TA is that it avoids the confusion inherent in AA of trying to establish 
how atemporal duration can be understood. However in terms of illuminating our 
understanding of eternity it is only able to provide a via negativa account once we 
move from Alpha-Beta to Alpha-E-entity. Although as mentioned in §5.1 this may be 
augmented by combining it with other understandings of eternity such as that 
provided by Sutherland. 
§5.2.1 Tensed-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity 
TA is perhaps the model of eternity most naturally suited to a relativistic 
understanding of time. The inability to raise internal questions from outside the 
reference frame a particular world has a clear correlation with the relativity of 
simultaneity, as does the denial of any divine reference frame. The conventionality 
of simultaneity, equally, isn’t an issue either due to the fact that times are world 
(reference frame) relative. The only difficulty stems from the fact that given 
eternity is not temporally or spatially related to Alpha there are philosophical 
questions about the precise nature of TA eternity and theological questions about 
the relationship between eternity and Alpha. However with respect to the 
relationship between TA and STR there do not appear to be any conflicts. 
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§5.3 External-Atemporality 
The concept of eternity as entirely “outside” time is s what springs to mind most 
readily in discussions of atemporality. One way to understand atemporality is from 
a reductionist perspective. As already noted109 Reductionists hold there can be no 
time outside the relationships between events in time. The reasons for holding a 
reductionist account of time are twofold. Firstly it would seem that by definition 
time is ‘a system of temporal relations among things and events’110, and therefore 
the concept of time existing without events is incoherent. Secondly, there is no 
reason for us posit “empty” time, and even if there were ‘we would not have any 
way of knowing about either its existence or its length’111. On this understanding of 
time, it is possible to argue that eternity was atemporal before there existed any 
events within it, and that at the moment of creation (or the first event) eternity 
then becomes temporal. For the purposes of this section I will only be concerned 
with how we might understand the atemporal aspect of this model of eternity. 
One way to understand EA is provided by Zimmerman112. Whilst Zimmerman does 
not address the question of External-Atemporality (EA) directly, he examines how it 
may be possible to understand God’s existence prior to time. Firstly, it is necessary 
to highlight some of Zimmerman’s assumptions. Time without change is examined 
from an A-theorist position, which as discussed in §2.1 holds that there ‘is an 
objectively distinguished present’ 113 . Due to this the relativity of simultaneity 
cannot be held to be true as the “simultaneity” discussed in STR is ‘something other 
than real simultaneity’114 and so accepting the relativity of simultaneity would be 
to claim that ‘what exists is relative to reference frame’115. 
The crux of this debate is whether it is possible to understand a first moment of 
time such that: 
(A1*) If a time t is such that (1) there is no temporally non-trivial property or 
relation P such that something ceased to have or began to have it before t, 
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and (2) nothing came into being or passed away before t, then t is the first 
instant of time116 
If time is understood as necessitating change, then in order for eternity to be 
atemporal there must be a first instant of time as otherwise eternity can only be 
understood in as temporal/sempiternal. However if time can be understood as 
having a beginning then this posits a “period” of atemporality prior to the first 
instant of time. This is the view that ‘if there were no creatures, there would be 
neither time, nor place, and consequently no actual space’117. This “time” before 
time is only possible if time does not require change, if this is the case then it is 
possible to understand atemporal eternity as the ‘neither infinite nor finite […] 
period of time during which no changes occurred’118.  
If one takes a relationist approach to time viewing times as either (1) sets of 
simultaneous events where events are understood as ‘particular things, usually 
spatially located and non-repeatable’119; or (2) abstract proposition-like entities 
that are ‘a complete, momentary state-of-the-whole-world’120, then it is possible to 
understand eternity as something other than a reduction to sempiternal 
temporality. On a relationist approach, times can only be understood as sets of 
events, given that in the “time” before creation there was only a single event or 
state-of-the-world because there are no changes, there is only one time before 
creation.  
Although it may seem that such an event must be temporally extended, given that 
it is a single event, and times are not ‘distinct from the events happening “at” 
them’121, any division of the event into temporally ordered successive parts would 
produce “times” that contain ‘the same partless event, and nothing more. So there 
is really only the one time before creation after all’122. Because there is no way to 
introduce distinctions into part times in this “dead time” it must be viewed as 
entirely atemporal. In order for a period of time to have parts and be extended 
there must be ‘different parts for each “place” in them at which an event could 
occur’123, if this is not possible, if there is only one “place” for events to occur and 
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if, consequently, it is impossible for there to be non-simultaneous events ‘then the 
“period” is but an instant’124. Whilst this may appear to reduce eternity to a finite 
time, Zimmerman argues that it is possible to deny the finitude of pre-creation 
time. He argues that just because these “times” must be able to be understood as 
instants in our ordinary and scientific contexts does not mean that they have to do 
so in every context. It would seem plausible to claim that as the pre-creation time 
contains only one event, in what will become an instant in post-creation time, it 
need not necessarily belong to the same category as post-creation instants. This is 
because in this ‘pre-creation, pre-laws-of-nature period, there is temporal duration 
but no way of dividing up into periods with lengths’125. It is important to note that 
this model of EA is entirely dependent on a reductionist account of time, if time in 
terms of Platonism (with respect to time), then it is not possible to posit “pre-
creation” atemporality.  
§5.3.1 External-Atemporality and Special Theory of Relativity 
The reductionist approach to time espoused in EA should theoretically give rise to 
time with a topology that is dependent ‘on contingent facts about the relations 
among things and events in the world’126. Yet STR has a global topology that that 
means that ‘having picked out the future light-cone at any one event, there is a 
unique way to determine the future light-cone at any other event’ 127 . The 
relativism of STR comes not from the events themselves but from the choice of 
reference frame, what reductionism requires is something far more fundamental. 
Reductionism says that the very fabric of spacetime should be affected by the 
events and objects within it.  
There are two points to note here: firstly the pre-creation atemporality of EA 
consists of only one event. This means the extent of the effect on the topology of 
time is questionable, and it would correlate to that fact that post creation (when 
there are more objects and events) the nature of time changes. Secondly, whilst 
the topology of STR is similar in structure to the topology of Euclidean space (see 
§3.3.2) and so not affected by the objects and events in it, the topology of GTR 
(which replaces STR at the cosmological level much as STR replaces Newtonian 
mechanics at astronomical distances128) is affected by the objects within it. This 
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means that there is ‘no unique or objective notion of “the geometry of space”’129. 
Therefore whilst STR would potentially rule EA as incoherent, I would maintain that 
on a wider scientific understanding all is not lost. 
§6 Temporal eternity 
Whilst the challenge to atemporal models of eternity is to adequately capture the 
nature of timeless “duration”, the challenge faced by temporal models is to 
capture eternity without descending into sempiternity. The most common ways that 
this is achieved are by placing eternity “outside” our time but enabling temporal 
succession within it, or by placing eternity “in” our time but claiming that 
succession is experienced as an extended “now”. In addition, understanding 
eternity as truly temporal as opposed to sempiternal often requires the introduction 
of an E-entity.  
§6.1 Transcendent-Eternity 
One way to understand temporal eternity is to claim that the temporal succession 
in eternity is not the same as temporal succession in temporality. Just as an object 
that is omnispatial (omnipresent) is both nowhere and everywhere, so it is possible 
to formulate a model of eternity that is omnitemporal at no time and every time. 
Given the breadth of definitions applied to omnitemporality in the proceeding 
discussion of DeWeese’s omnitemporality 130 , I will use the term Transcendent-
Eternity (TE). 
As already mentioned, analogies can be made between TE and omnispatiality. If an 
omnispatial object is taken to be neither occupying space nor limited by ‘spatial 
points which define its surface’ 131  yet nevertheless present to space, a 
transcendently eternal object can be viewed as one which is not located in physical 
time but present to all times. However the key distinction between an omnispatial 
and a transcendently-eternal object it that an object in TE will be temporally 
limited by the present instant. This limitation occurs because of DeWeese’s 
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adoption of a presentist view of time132, although given DeWeese’s definition of TE 
it isn’t technically a limitation.  
DeWeese defines an omnitemporal being as ‘one that is present to every actual 
moment of time, without thereby being located in physical time’133. This definition 
highlights two key features of TE: which times it is co-present with, and what kind 
of time is being discussed. The limit of TE by the present instant doesn’t restrict 
the omnitemporality of TE, due to the fact that it is being b=discussed in terms of a 
presentist framework, this means that the present instant is the only time that is 
real. Claiming that TE should be present to unreal times would be like claiming that 
an omnispatial object should be present at locations that don’t exist, it is not the 
limit in the sense of restricting what is possible, rather it simply delineates that the 
limits are those of possibility.  
The requirement of co-presence to physical time prevents TE from becoming 
sempiternity. What it distinguishes TE is that it is located within metaphysical time 
whereas the temporality of creation is located in physical time. Whereas physical 
time is dependent on there being regular physical laws that provide a temporal 
metric, metaphysical time does not require regular physical laws. Rather ‘the flow 
and direction of metaphysical time grounds the ordering relations of physical 
time’134. This means that even if our world had no regular physical laws providing 
the temporal metric it would still ‘undergo a succession of moments (flow) with a 
determinate order (direction)’135 that was grounded in metaphysical time. It is also 
important to note that due to the topology of presentist time ‘the “now” of 
metaphysical time coincides with the “now” of any possible physical time’ 136 
meaning that TE is ‘temporally present at every present moment of any possible 
physical time’137. 
TE has two key features, it has temporal properties (or succession) in relation to 
metaphysical time and it is present to all actual moments of any temporal world. In 
order for metaphysical time to exist i.e. for there to be metaphysical temporality, 
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there must be a causal relation occurring. In order for there to be a causal relation 
occurring in metaphysical time, there must be an E-entity in TE, and it is the 
‘causal states of mental states in [the E-entity that] […] grounds the flow and 
direction of metaphysical time’138. However even without a metric to metaphysical 
time, it would still be possible for events within metaphysical time to be ordered in 
a one-to-one relation with events in physical time.  Such a relationship however 
would not provide the ability to define durations in metaphysical time due to the 
fact that without an intrinsic metric there would be no quantitative temporal 
relations within TE139. 
The second key feature of TE is that it is present to all times. This can be 
understood as the claim that for every temporal time tt that is present in a 
temporal world W, it is also present within metaphysical time tm such that there is 
no time earlier or later than tt that is actual at tm. What this means is that there is 
a simultaneity relationship between tm and tt (i.e. between metaphysical and 
physical time) such that ‘to be present at [temporal] time [tt] is to be present at 
metaphysical time [tm] and vice versa’140. Thus the temporality of TE is provided in 
the fact that there exists temporal succession with metaphysical time as a result of 
the conscious activity of the E-entity. This allows there to be temporal relations 
between TE and our temporal world, and the eternality of TE is provided through 
the fact that it is not subject to physical time. In other words ‘there are intervals 
within [eternity] […], but those intervals have no specific or intrinsic temporal 
measure’141 hence eternity is both “timeless” and “temporal”. 
§6.1.1 Transcendent-Eternity and Special Theory of Relativity 
TE makes a distinction between measured time and metaphysical or cosmic time; it 
is also dependent upon an A-Theory view of time 142. In distinguishing between 
metaphysical and measured time TE, avoids the problem associated with other A-
theories that require the selection of a particular frame of reference and thus 
alignment with a particular “now” 143 . In separating measured time from 
                                                          
138 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. P.253 
139 Quantitative temporal relations are those in which duration can be meaningfully discussed such as 
an event last 5 metaphysical seconds or 3 metaphysical years etc. 
140 DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. P.254 
141 Alan G Padgett, ‘God and Time: Relative Timelessness Reconsidered’, in Science and religion in 
dialogue, ed. by Melville Y. Stewart, 2 vols. (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), II, 884–892. P.885 
142 That the A-theory or dynamic time is the only correct model of time is endorsed by both Alan G 
Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001). 
(especially Ch.5) and DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time. (Ch.2) 
143 William Lane Craig, ‘God and Real Time’, Religious Studies, 26 (1990), 335–347. 
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metaphysical time, TE in fact avoids many issues of STR. This is because the 
conventionality and relativity occur with respect to measured time, and in 
separating the two DeWeese and Padgett are able to deny the applicability of the 
conventionality of simultaneity. However Maudlin cautions against placing too great 
an emphasis on conventionality when:  
The fact that Lorentz coordinates, with their relations to the behaviour of 
light and clocks […] the fact that all light emitted from an event propagates 
along a vacuum […] the existence of co-moving clocks as we have defined 
them, is not a convention. The postulation of Minkowski space-time is a 
physical thesis, not a convention144 
In opposition to the position set out in §4.2, and with respect to TE, Craig145 argues 
against simultaneity as entirely relative 146 . Craig takes issue with Einstein’s 
definition of simultaneity being dependent upon the times recorded by synchronised 
clocks, and the conventionality of the one-way speed of light. Craig’s argument 
against relativity and conventionality of simultaneity is based on the fact that the 
measurements of the two synchronized clocks (for example at the end of the twin 
paradox) are incorrect. What the clocks fail to accurately measure is “true” or 
metaphysical time, and what STR represents is a theory not about the ontology of 
time, but about the behaviour of physical objects. For Craig, Einstein’s positivism in 
denying the role of the aether in defining the ‘correct’ reference frame highlights 
the fact that the relativity of STR is based on measured and not metaphysical time. 
The question is what does this mean for the role of STR in defining the coherence of 
TE? The point of whether or not we accept Craig’s argument is to some extent 
moot. This is because the simultaneity deals with the empirical results of measured 
time, what TE deals with in positing metaphysical time is some “greater” time that 
isn’t subject to the whims of reference frames, but which is unobservable. From a 
scientific standpoint it is initially tempting to argue that what TE is in fact trying to 
do is to select a preferential reference frame. However it is also possible to argue 
that the expansion of the universe, the detection of anisotropy147 or even GTR all 
point towards the existence of some kind of cosmic time. Whilst STR, whether 
conventional or not applies to measured time, there is no reason to believe that if 
                                                          
144 Maudlin, Philosophy of Physics. P.96 
145 Craig. 
146 Whilst I stated in §4.2 that I was siding with Petkov on the conventionality of simultaneity, I feel 
that as this non-conventionality thesis is proposed specifically in support of metaphysical time it is 
worth examining 
147  the property of being directionally dependent 
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there exists some form of metaphysical time it would necessarily be subject to STR. 
Therefore given our inability to disprove metaphysical time it would seem fair to 
claim that TE coheres with STR. 
§6.2 Presentist-Eternity 
I have already examined one model that tries to explain eternity in terms of 
experience “all at once”. However Presentist Eternity (PE) faces a different 
challenge to AA, rather than the difficulty of successionless duration PE has to 
explain how an instantaneous mode of being can be temporal. 
There are three key notions of the “present” explored by Harris absolute, time-lag 
and specious. Our common understanding of the present in the West is based on the 
Newtonian vision of the now as a knife edge that separates the past and the 
future148, or as a line that is disappearing as fast as it is appearing149. The absolute 
present is our pre-philosophical notion of the present. However this conception of 
an instantaneous present is not mirrored in our everyday language, where it is used 
to mean an extended “now” i.e. she is running the race. J.L. Austin points to the 
fact that the present has no univocal meaning; it can range from the present 
moment, to the present century.  In this sense “present” can be viewed as indexical 
and as devoid of meaning as “this” or “that”. Sense-data theorists speak of the 
time-lag present, by which they mean the experienced present is never at the same 
“now” as the causal stimulus.  Harris argues that our experience of the “present” 
(aside from phenomenological) is not of the absolute now. It is not filled with 
discrete individual sensation but with a “flow”150, our “present” experience must 
always contain ‘some semblance of future and past; that is […] must have a 
duration which is both “rearward and forward looking”’ 151. However within the 
specious present there is able to be ordering and structuring of thought and 
experience into a temporal “before” and “after” even though the present is a 
rolling instant. There are several key arguments examined by Harris that point to 
the need to understand “present” as something far more fluid than a knife-edge. If 
                                                          
148 James F. Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’, International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion, 22 (1987), 165–183 <doi:10.2307/40018834>. P.168 
149 Nelson. P.13 
150This is contrary to Brading’s analysis of our experience of the present in her paper ‘Physically 
Locating the Present: a Case of Reading Physics as a Contribution to Philosophy’, where she analyses 
our experience of time by examining what elements of our experience can be said to correlate to 
elements of Minkowski spacetime. She concludes that ‘there is nothing within the structure of 
Minkowski spacetime that could be correlated with the “now”’ (P.12-13) 
151 William James cited in Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’. P.174 
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we are able to do this it would seem to offer a unique way to understand temporal 
eternity that does not reduce it to an unextended instant or sempiternity. 
In looking outside the Newtonian view of time it is possible for PE to provide a 
model of the present that comports with our experience of reality, and so provide a 
‘revised empiricist account which is rich enough to give us a conceptual 
understanding of eternity’152. Whilst it is possible for us to discretely demark a 
succession of “nows” our ‘successive acts of recognition or apperception’153 do not 
remove our experience of events as a continuous “flowing” sensation. It is the 
“flowing” of the present and the way that it is addressed that separates PE from 
AA. AA cannot allow for temporal succession within the present, whereas for PE the 
‘semblance of future and past’154 that is contained within the present is the key to 
understanding temporal eternity. Because this model is based on the experience of 
the present PE requires an E-entity. 
PE proposes a model of eternity in which eternity can be viewed as analogous to our 
temporal experience of the specious present. The specious present is the time 
duration during which perceptions are considered to be in the present, and it 
highlights the fact that rather than being directly perceived time is “reconstructed” 
by the brain. William James and Alfred Whitehead disagree on the length of the 
specious present in human, with Whitehead arguing it only lasts for 0.5 seconds 
whereas James argues it lasts between 6 and 12 seconds. This variation highlights 
that fact that the specious present is affected by contingent factors. The influence 
of contingent factors supports Harris’ claim that the limit placed on the length of 
the specious present is arbitrary and thus if we can imagine a human with a 
specious present of twelve seconds why not thirteen, if thirteen why not fourteen 
etc.  
If the specious present is to be understood as being in direct relation to the ability 
to discern discrete events, which in turn is dependent upon our stimulus 
threshold155, then there is no reason why an eternal specious present could not 
contain all of spacetime. The specious present allows for us to integrate our 
experience and overcome the fact that ‘stimuli are temporary and changing’156, 
                                                          
152 Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’. P.172 
153 Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’. P.173 
154 Harris, ‘An Empirical Understanding of Eternality’. P.174 
155 Stimulus threshold is the level or strength that a stimulus must have in order to register in our 
consciousness 
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without which our experience would be chaotic. It is the role of consciousness to 
place order and structure onto the “flow” and it is this structure that creates the 
temporal succession within the specious present.  
I think that there are two ways to move forward with eternity as the specious 
present. Either eternity must be rooted in metaphysical time, in which case PE can 
be argued to work alongside TE whereby TE explains the eternal-temporal relation 
and PE simply adds to our conceptual understanding of eternality; or PE is to be 
understood as sempiternity within which the experience of the passage of time by 
the E-entity is analogous to our own temporal experience, and as such eternity is 
not an entirely different mode of being but an extended mode of temporal being. 
§6.2.1 Presentist-Eternity and Special Theory of Relativity 
The impact of STR on PE depends on whether one understands it to be located 
within metaphysical or physical time. If we take it to be located in metaphysical 
time, and maintain that an eternalist view of time is correct, it would seem quite 
plausible for an E-entity to be able to have a specious present that could include 
spacetime in its entirety. As with TE there are question as to the nature of the 
interaction between metaphysical and physical time, but these concerns do not lie 
within the scope of this thesis.  
Perhaps the greater challenge lies in understanding PE as located within physical 
time. The question then becomes one of how it is possible to understand a stimulus 
threshold that is able to encapsulate all of spacetime. The initial assumption is that 
although the relativity of simultaneity allows for spacetime to be divided into 
infinitely many foliations, the amount of information that could potentially be 
received by an E-entity must be limited by the constancy of the speed of light. It 
would seem that even with a zero stimulus threshold the amount of information 
that could be known is limited by the speed of light. Interestingly, however, 
Maudlin notes that whilst the speed of light is constant in all Lorentz coordinate 
systems it ‘is not constant in other coordinate systems that could be defined in 
Minkowski space-time’157. This means that potentially, given the correct coordinate 
system, even an E-entity within physical space could receive stimulus from the 
entirety of Mst that could be perceived as a specious present.  
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§7 Summaries and Conclusions 
STR is perhaps the most commonly used scientific model of time in discussions of 
philosophical theology. The relativity of simultaneity, along with the time dilation 
associated with objects in relative motion (the twin paradox) provides fertile 
ground for explaining how it might be possible to understand divine attributes such 
as omniscience and how eternity may be more than sempiternity.  
What has been shown in the process of this thesis is that STR can and does have a 
role to play in understanding the extent to which philosophical models of eternity 
may provide a realistic description of the possibilities of eternal existence. Perhaps 
the biggest successes lie in models such as EA and TE that, through the introduction 
of metaphysical time, are resilient to the effects of STR without reducing eternity 
to a psychological aspect of experienced time. I believe that examining eternity in 
light of STR is valuable in establishing the metaphysical possibilities of eternity as a 
genuine feature of reality. I also believe that the eternalist view of time provided 
by STR provides a stable framework in which to examine eternity. However until 
there is a physical concept of time that is able to work coherently across STR, GTR 
and QM further research is necessary to establish which models can also stand up 
the challenges they provide. 
Does STR have a role to play in the formation of a coherent model of eternity? Yes 
but other scientific theories of time also have a role to play, and if we find a model 
of eternity that is able to be defended in the face of GTR and QM too, the we will 
have found a model that is robust enough that we can knowledgably discuss the 
kind of divine attributes that are possible within it. 
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Appendix A – Two dimensional Diagram of the Twin Paradox158 
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